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Abstract. Grids are key technologies to federate data distributed in multiple neuro-
science centers, thus enabling large scale multi-centric studies. However, the take
up of these technologies is slow due to the difficulty to manipulate sensitive neuro-
radiological data in an open environment and the recognized risk of federated sites
to loose control over their valuable data. In this paper we propose a distributed data
access control policy, enabling the federation of existing data stores, where local
security policies prevail, to supports multi-centric neuroscience studies. It achieves
a compromise between enabling collaborative work through data sharing and pre-
venting unauthorized access to data in a competitive environment.
Keywords. Distributed security policy. Medical data sharing. Collaborative
distributed environment.
1. Distribution of neuroradiological data and access control
Computational neuroscience experiments rely heavily on the ability of brain image
databases. Acquisition of this data is a costly process, resulting from the careful selection
of target populations (patients and normal controls), the design of rigorous acquisition
procedures, and the identification of examinations that show no biases and that can fi-
nally be integrated into the study database. Consequently, neuroscience centers are often
reluctant to exchange their valuable data sources. However, the challenging population
aging problems cause an ever growing need for larger and more specific neuroradiologi-
cal data sets that can be achieved through multi-centric studies design and selected data
sets sharing. Many initiatives are emerging today to propose an HealthGrid-based collab-
orative environment for supporting multi-centric neuroscience studies [8,?,?]. The adop-
tion of these new technologies will depend on the confidence the end users will grant to
these systems, especially the control they have on the data that is exchanged with other
partners.
In the context of the NeuroLOG project [8], we aim at building a federation of neu-
roscience sites with both collaborative interests and competitive activities. This paper fo-
cuses on the distributed security policy designed to accomodate these two partly contra-
dictory aspects. More specifically, the system needs to address four requirements: (R1)
medical data protection, (R2) distributed control over data sources with prevailing lo-
cal policies, (R3) support for multi-centric studies involving data sharing, and (R4) au-
tonomous sites administration. Similar requirements are exhibited in a detailed analysis
of security requirements for Neurosciences dedicated e-Infrastructures [12]: “On the one
hand, the local administrator must find a way to translate their local policies to a com-
mon interface that can be understood by remote users as local. On the other hand, there
must be a way for the remote user to gain fine-grained and secure access to individual
data fields and parameters”. Similar security requirements are also identified in the de-
sign of the @neurIST platform, aimed at improving research and clinical care of cerebral
aneurisms [9].
Grid technologies have for long set the security infrastructure at the heart of mid-
dleware design and grid services interoperability layer. They enable the federation of
data distributed over cross-institution storage resources, thus directly addressing R3.
The solution proposed in this paper satisfies R1 through a standard X509 certificates-
based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the AES encryption algorithm that provide
cross-institutional authentication and secured communication. The Shamir secret sharing
scheme gained adoption in several medical data access grid services to protect the AES
keys against the insider abuse threat [11,7,2,10,4]. It is an interesting perspective for our
system.
R2 and R4 are more difficult to address. Centralized data access control mecha-
nisms such as the traditional grid VO Management System (VOMS) [3] cause an ex-
ternalization of data access control that is not accepted by neuroscience centers. VOMS
are too heavy-weighted to set up light collaborations and, more importantly, require an
agreement on a global authority or system super-users with privileges over multiple sites
data access. Conversely, neurosciences request a data federation system which does not
compromise sites data beyond the objects of collaboration decided and which does not
interfere with the normal autonomous operation of the sites.
To tackle the centralization issues of VOMS, the Shibboleth’s [1] decentralized ap-
proach to authentication and authorization is gaining adoption in grid communities. The
central idea is that a remote referee authority authenticates and authorizes its users by
generating and providing to users a security assertion including user’s access rights (se-
curity attributes). The main advantage of this approach is the decentralized authentica-
tion and attributes assignment. However, with this approach data sharing in the context
of multi-centric neurology studies would be under the responsibility of a plethora of site-
specific authorities, while none of them owns access control rights on other sites data
items. A key contribution of this paper is the decoupling of local data access rights as-
signment, performed by local site administrators, and distributed studies access rights
assignment, delegated to a remote administrator.
In [5], Chadwick et al. propose PERMIS, a modular authorization infrastructure in-
tegrated within Globus Toolkit 4 and Shibboleth.It provides a hierarchical access control
policies management and an access control decision engine. PERMIS enables the defi-
nition of various security policies, involving distribution of attributes in site-wise reposi-
tories whereas our approach propose a non-trivial security policy where federation-wide
unique roles are recognized and coherently managed in the federation.
2. Security model
2.1. From independent to collaborative trust domains
The collaborating environment should not interfere with the normal autonomous opera-
tion of the sites, where multi-sites capabilities is not required (R4). Each center involved
in the federation is responsible for registering its own users, as it is usually the case in
autonomous entities. It is administrating a local Certification Authority (Site CA), em-
powered to deliver and sign site user certificates, thus delineating a local trust domain.
To enable multi-centric studies the neuroscience centers involved have to interconnect
their trust domains. This is achieved through a standard certification chain: a root CA is
delivering all Site CA certificates. The root CA is hosted in a coordination node named
Federation Registry. This is the only centralized component in the system.
Two data protection policies, corresponding to two levels of privacy, are imple-
mented in our system. Minimally, all communications is protected: data is encrypted dur-
ing transfers only. Potentially the system can be configured so that data is also encrypted
on disk. The first policy is acceptable in a research context where the manipulated data
is anonymized prior to importation. It facilitates data manipulation locally while guaran-
teeing that data is protected when transferred outside. The second policy addresses the
stronger data protection need considered in the context of clinical deployment or sites on
which all local users should not access the complete data base.
2.2. Decentralized access control policy
As outlined in the introduction, the key problem with most existing grid security environ-
ments is the difficulty to define an authorization policy acceptable for the neurosciences
community. The main contribution of this work is a decentralized data access control
policy where local policies prevail. Our access control mechanism is based on traditional
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [6]. RBAC assigns permissions to roles (the user
possible functions) in such a way that access control policies remain light and easy to
understand. Most existing RBAC systems are centralized and they manage two different
functions simultaneously: (i) the assignment of roles to users and (ii) the definition of
access rights for each role. Our systems decouples these two functions as detailed below.
On each site, at least one administrator has privileges to register the site users and to
maintain the site’s access control policy. Users may belong to different trust domains (a
system administrator usually has no complete view of the potential users of the system)
while the access rights to data of a given domain has to be ultimately controlled by this
domain’s administrator. The compromise to enable collaborative work while ensuring
site-wise access control to local data is as follows:
• Site administrators are capable of creating federation-wide roles, as many as
needed to describe their access control policies;
• The creator of a role controls the assignment of all system users to that role: the
management of a particular role is centralized on one of the sites.
• Each site administrator controls the assignment of federation-wide roles to per-
missions related to their local resources.
A user is granted access to a data item if she belongs to at least one role that is locally
authorized to access this item. This policy framework ensures that sites solely control
access to their data: only a site administrator can bind some role to her data. It also en-
sures that each role is well defined and administrated: only the role creator can bind users
to that role. It implies a collaboration between the data owner and the role creator: the
data owner agrees to make some data accessible for a particular role (e.g. in the context
of a particular multi-centric study); the role administrator is trusted and recognized as
the administrator for this particular study. Any user in the federation can collaborate to
the study: through the certification chains, the role administrator can validate the iden-
tity of any user before assigning the role to her. Finally, the roles are guaranteed to be
unique federation-wide through the Federation Registry. Roles can only be created after
assignment of a unique name through the unique Registry.
This system is agile and preserves sites autonomy: sites are only tightly coupled to
the Registry and they do not depend on it for their normal operation. The authorization
scheme is lightweight and can quickly dynamically evolve to adapt to new needs for
collaborative studies.
3. Implementation
The NeuroLOG platform [8] involves a single Federation Registry root server dedicated
to the coordination of the platform, multiple intercommunicating Site Servers which are
implementing most of the middleware functionality and distributed Clients from which
users authenticate and connect to the system. Identification and data protection are opera-
tionalized through standard OpenSSL, Java Secure Socket Extension, Java Public Key In-
frastructure and Java Cryptography Architecture. Authorization concerns different med-
ical services (data, metadata and semantic data management, data analysis workflows
management) that are exposed using either Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) or
Web Service (WS) interfaces. We validated that the proposed security model can be in-
tegrated in this heterogeneous services framework, noting that authentication of users as
needed for implementing the authorization policy is neither straight forward with RMIs
nor with WSs.
The authentication at the application level of services communicating through high-
level protocols (such as RMI’s JRMP or WS’s SOAP protocols) over pre-established
SSL connections requires specific treatment. Once an SSL communication is established,
those protocols do not provide control, at server side, over the identity of the caller emit-
ting high-level protocol messages. For instance, while opening an SSL channel with a
Site Server, the identity of a user is validated through SSL handshaking. However, several
clients may similarly connect to the same server which receives multiple requests with-
out knowing who effectively performed each of them. This issue brings a major security
requirement at application level that is authentication (re-identification) of the caller of
a specific operation in the service. This problem is dealt with differently in the cases of
RMI and WS servers.
In the case of RMIs, each remote method invocation is guarded by the control of the
identity of the client at application level. Authentication tokens are added to RMI calls as
additional, non-functional parameters to ensure re-identification of the client. The caller
generates and transmits a ciphered and time-stamped invocation token for each call of a
sensitive remote method. The server retrieves the client certificate from its SSL context.
Re-identification of the client is guaranteed by the success of token deciphering, and time
validity checking.
In the case of WSs, the security context depends on the service container. Similarly
to the RMIs case, a Web Server transporting messages over HTTPS will benefit from
SSL handshaking to identify the caller. However, simple stand alone web services en-
counter the same limitation: re-identifying the user connected is not possible and an au-
thentication token is needed in the WS operation call to perform access control at the
service level. Alternatively, the web services can be hosted in a container. In this case,
the container provides the functionality needed to retrieve the SSL identity of any caller,
thus enabling re-identification without any extra token.
4. Illustration through a generic use case
Let us consider three sites A, B and C participating in the federation as shown in figure 1.
Given a collaborative study initiated by site A, the goal of site B is to share a set of owned
data with partners involved in that study The site administrators have to agree on the
unique name, say StudyA, for the collaboration role. They share the study in several steps:
(i) the administrator of Site A declares the StudyA role on the Registry, thus associating
it with her site; (ii) she potentially grant permissions onto hosted data for this shared
role through the local access control policy (study read permission, for instance); (iii)
she registers any user (local or foreign) participating in the study by assigning her the
StudyA role; and (iv) after importation of dataset D within Site B, the administrator of
Site B shares D with participants in StudyA through the creation of a local authorization
rule.
Site A Site B
Site C - user
1: retrieval of D
2: access control for D
2.1: retrieve the roles 
for D in the policy
2.3: delegate role 
assignement checking
4: decision on access control
2.2: retrieve the instigator of a role
3: remote role 
assignment checking
3.1: local role 
assignment checking
NeuroLOG Registry
Figure 1. Decentralized access control
Let us now consider a user of Site C, involved in StudyA who needs to retrieve a
shared data hosted by Site B. Figure 1 details the distributed access control: (activity
1) the user from Site C requests from Site B the retrieval of dataset D; (activity 2) Site
B controls the permissions of the user over D by (2.1) retrieving in the local access
control policy, the collection of roles attached to D, (2.2) retrieving the initiator sites
for the resulting collection of roles; and (activity 3) delegating to each initiator site, the
checking of role assignment to the user. If one of the collaborating sites validates the
role assignment checking, then the access control is performed regarding the permission
associated to the data and the role.
5. Perspectives and future works
Neuroscience centers have both collaborative interests and competitive activities. Their
temptation to share neuroradiological resources is often counter-balanced by the fear of
loosing control over precious data, which acquisition is a costly process. Building on the
foundational grid security layer, the distributed access control framework proposed in
this paper addresses neuroscientists needs for enabling multi-centric studies by federat-
ing existing, heterogeneous site environments while respecting local data access policies.
This infrastructure enables autonomous sites operation and it does not require a central-
ized administration. This policy is validated through an implementation and practical set
up problems related to client-server communications with RMIs and WSs are taken into
account.
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